This paper highlights the history of the Army electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) program, including the management approaches that were used to execute the program. Weaknesses in this process resulted in very serious system deficiencies that have been difficult and expensive to correct. The paper reviews the Department of the Army (DA) policy changes that have been implemented to improve the E3 program. Key changes include the establishment of E3
Army E3 Focused on Teaming
DA E3 policy was refocused by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) in Policy Memorandum 91-3 of 22 January 1991. This memorandum provided new policy guidance on the E3 program, stating the program's goal to identify and quantify system limitations when operating in its expected electromagnetic environment (EME). The AAE memorandum identified the major players as project managers and other program sponsors, user representatives, and technical matrix organizations supporting programs. The new Army policy mandated use of E3RBs to team all the program acquisition disciplines in advisory groups designed to support E3 decisions made by program managers regarding complex EMEs such as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Figure 1. Complex Electromagnetic Environment

History
The E3 program dates back to the early days of electronic systems on the battlefield. As early as the 1930s and 1940s, interference from friendly as well as hostile forces was of great importance to tactical communications.
During this period, the exploration of higher frequency bands was evolving. By the early 1940s, use of a portion of the UHF spectrum (200 to 600 I MHz) was well established. World War I1 was accompanied by additional expansion into the microwave bands above 1 GHz. In parallel with this trend, continued improvement in technology resulted in increased power from radio-frequency (RF) sources and higher sensitivity of receiver systems. More recently, commencing with the Vietnam conflict, the sophistication and sensitivity of electronic battlefield systems to both friendly and hostile sources of interference became even more significant. Jamming and propagation problems became major factors in the determination of communications systems performance, and cosite interference became a major source of interference.
During the 1980s, battlefield automation and system complexity became significant E3 factors on the global battlefield. Further, system sensitivity to outside disturbances has multiplied tenfold with the introduction of integrated circuit technology and improved solid state amplification in the GHz bands.
Hardening these systems to the EME has been difficult and expensive. The advent of nondevelopmental items (NDIs) and their compressed acquisition approaches during the mid-1980s added a level of uncertainty to adequately defining the EME in which a system must perform. Program officers and their staffs were focused on fielding new products quickly at reduced cost. Some NDI technology provided only the level of EME protection inherent in existing product design. Hardware acquired through the NDI process was selected based on existing capabilities with little regard to the impact that other battlefield systems might have on performance. Emerging problems with complexity and battlefield automation were generally not considered. The current geopolitical situation that potentially places former Red emitters on the same side of the battlefield as the friendly Blues was certainly not considered by acquisition staffs prior to 199 1.
A New Way of Doing Business
The new policy implemented in 1991 is designed to focus on these weaknesses through the use of integrated teams of Army acquisition staff composed of project managers, their technical matrix staff, and the combat developers. These teams are the E3RBs. They are designed to act as advisory bodies to support project decisions that are driven by the electromagnetic environments in which the system must survive. Key responsibilities of the boards are defining the environment, determining its impact on the system, and designing and taking corrective action to reduce system vulnerability. Solutions may take the form of design changes, operational workarounds, or avoidance when all else has been ruled impractical or impossible.
CECOM Program
The Each of these boards has been operated as an advisory group to the program manager. The boards use the tools of TQM to develop the environment in which the system must survive, work the system vulnerabilities, and develop action plans for their respective PMs. This process flow is depicted in Figure 2 . Generally, all of the boards have had regular meetings and have at least published an initial report on significant results. Some of the interesting efforts to date include:
Predicting levels of vulnerability.
-Informing users of operational workarounds.
Supporting 461/462 Standards tailored for NDI acquisitions.
Determining impacts on collocated systems.
Integrating platforms.
Focusing on the impact of battlefield automation. 
Appeals to Higher Authorities
Figure 2. E3RB Process
As a result of the TEAMING and sharing of knowledge/skills among the key players, several program weaknesses were uncovered. All of these issues have been shared through a CECOM working group chaired by the CECOM command representative.
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The CECOM boards address issues that include:
In-band communication engineering analysis.
Battlefield automation.
Propagation impact. EM1 budgeting.
Army Materiel Command Working Group
An Army Materiel Command (AMC) working group shares ideas among Army commodity managers. Issues concerning AMC and DA have been presented at the AMC-based Army E3 Board.
In some cases, these issues were solved by the individual boards; in others, issues have been elevated to the AMC group to be worked by representatives of all of the major subordinate commands. Major issues at the AMC level include:
Environment determination and maintenance.
Maintenance of E3 awareness for all career disciplines.
Funding.
Process for lightninghuclear.
E3 Future
The future of the E3 program remains bright.
Even with the significant budgetary constraints all DoD staff are facing, this program has the visibility to survive. More important, the thrust of using the E3RB approach has achieved measurable results. Effort for the major systems will continue with the focus on emerging battlefield scenarios, platform integration, and battlefield automated systems.
During the first year of the process, several new PM-managed boards have been chartered in the space and intelligence/electronic warfare worlds. This expansion will continue.
A CECOM Level II/III program for smaller systems and components started in 1992. This process is tailored to the large number of systems and components that CECOM provides to the rest of the Army. These E3RBs are designed to be commodity oriented. The first Level II/III E3RB is supporting CECOM's aviation-related products. The overall process for Level II/III systems has been developed by a process action team made up of representatives from the directorates that are part of the process. It is the same process used on major system programs but is focused more on platform integration. Major team players include the project office, users, and technical staff.
To summarize, the Army has had an E3 program for many years. AAE Memorandum 91-3 initiated a recent DA refocus. CECOM implemented the program for major systems during 1991 and is currently implementing the program for all its systems during 1992. The key to continued success will be measurable results that save Army dollars. To date the program track record is excellent. 
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